형이상학/형이상학Ζ

[1028a][10] Τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς, καθάπερ διειλόμεθα πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ ποσαχῶς· σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ μὲν τί ἐστι καὶ τόδε τι, τὸ δὲ ποιὸν ἢ ποσὸν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν οὕτω κατηγορουμένων. Τοσαυταχῶς δὲ λεγομένου τοῦ ὄντος φανερὸν ὅτι τούτων πρῶτον ὂν τὸ τί ἐστιν, ὅπερ σημαίνει [15] τὴν οὐσίαν (ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἴπωμεν ποῖόν τι τόδε, ἢ ἀγαθὸν λέγομεν ἢ κακόν, ἀλλ' οὐ τρίπηχυ ἢ ἄνθρωπον· ὅταν δὲ τί ἐστιν, οὐ λευκὸν οὐδὲ θερμὸν οὐδὲ τρίπηχυ, ἀλλὰ ἄνθρωπον ἢ θεόν), τὰ δ' ἄλλα λέγεται ὄντα τῷ τοῦ οὕτως ὄντος τὰ μὲν ποσότητες εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ποιότητες, τὰ δὲ πάθη, τὰ δὲ [20] ἄλλο τι. Διὸ κἂν ἀπορήσειέ τις πότερον τὸ βαδίζειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τὸ καθῆσθαι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ὂν σημαίνει, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐστὶν οὔτε καθ' αὑτὸ πεφυκὸς οὔτε χωρίζεσθαι δυνατὸν τῆς οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, εἴπερ, τὸ βαδίζον [25] τῶν ὄντων καὶ τὸ καθήμενον καὶ τὸ ὑγιαῖνον. Ταῦτα δὲ μᾶλλον φαίνεται ὄντα, διότι ἔστι τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς ὡρισμένον (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον) ὅπερ ἐμφαίνεται ἐν τῇ κατηγορίᾳ τῇ τοιαύτῃ· τὸ ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ἢ τὸ καθήμενον οὐκ ἄνευ τούτου λέγεται. Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διὰ [30] ταύτην κἀκείνων ἕκαστον ἔστιν, ὥστε τὸ πρώτως ὂν καὶ οὐ τὶ ὂν ἀλλ' ὂν ἁπλῶς ἡ οὐσία ἂν εἴη. Πολλαχῶς μὲν οὖν λέγεται τὸ πρῶτον· ὅμως δὲ πάντως ἡ οὐσία πρῶτον, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ γνώσει καὶ χρόνῳ. Τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων κατηγορημάτων οὐθὲν χωριστόν, αὕτη δὲ μόνη· καὶ τῷ λόγῳ δὲ τοῦτο [35] πρῶτον (ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἑκάστου λόγῳ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας ἐνυπάρχειν)· καὶ εἰδέναι δὲ τότ' οἰόμεθα ἕκαστον μάλιστα, ὅταν τί ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος γνῶμεν ἢ τὸ πῦρ,

[1028b][1] μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ποιὸν ἢ τὸ ποσὸν ἢ τὸ πού, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων τότε ἕκαστον ἴσμεν, ὅταν τί ἐστι τὸ ποσὸν ἢ τὸ ποιὸν γνῶμεν. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ πάλαι τε καὶ νῦν καὶ ἀεὶ ζητούμενον καὶ ἀεὶ ἀπορούμενον, τί τὸ ὄν, τοῦτό ἐστι τίς ἡ οὐσία (τοῦτο γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἓν εἶναί [5] φασιν οἱ δὲ πλείω ἢ ἕν, καὶ οἱ μὲν πεπερασμένα οἱ δὲ ἄπειρα), διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν καὶ μάλιστα καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μόνον ὡς εἰπεῖν περὶ τοῦ οὕτως ὄντος θεωρητέον τί ἐστιν.

Δοκεῖ δ' ἡ οὐσία ὑπάρχειν φανερώτατα μὲν τοῖς σώμασιν (διὸ τά τε ζῷα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῶν [10] οὐσίας εἶναί φαμεν, καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα, οἷον πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστον, καὶ ὅσα ἢ μόρια τούτων ἢ ἐκ τούτων ἐστίν, ἢ μορίων ἢ πάντων, οἷον ὅ τε οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ, ἄστρα καὶ σελήνη καὶ ἥλιος)· πότερον δὲ αὗται μόναι οὐσίαι εἰσὶν ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι, ἢ τούτων τινὲς [15] ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι, ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐθὲν ἕτεραι δέ τινες, σκεπτέον. Δοκεῖ δέ τισι τὰ τοῦ σώματος πέρατα, οἷον ἐπιφάνεια καὶ γραμμὴ καὶ στιγμὴ καὶ μονάς, εἶναι οὐσίαι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ στερεόν. Ἔτι παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ οἱ μὲν οὐκ οἴονται εἶναι οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον, οἱ δὲ πλείω καὶ μᾶλλον ὄντα ἀί̈δια, ὥσπερ Πλάτων [20] τά τε εἴδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ δύο οὐσίας, τρίτην δὲ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων οὐσίαν, Σπεύσιππος δὲ καὶ πλείους οὐσίας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀρξάμενος, καὶ ἀρχὰς ἑκάστης οὐσίας, ἄλλην μὲν ἀριθμῶν ἄλλην δὲ μεγεθῶν, ἔπειτα ψυχῆς· καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἐπεκτείνει τὰς οὐσίας. Ἔνιοι δὲ [25] τὰ μὲν εἴδη καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν φασὶ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐχόμενα, γραμμὰς καὶ ἐπίπεδα, μέχρι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ οὐσίαν καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά. Περὶ δὴ τούτων τί λέγεται καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς, καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν οὐσίαι, καὶ πότερον εἰσί τινες παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητὰς ἢ οὐκ εἰσί, καὶ αὗται πῶς [30] εἰσί, καὶ πότερον ἔστι τις χωριστὴ οὐσία, καὶ διὰ τί καὶ πῶς, ἢ οὐδεμία, παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητάς, σκεπτέον, ὑποτυπωσαμένοις τὴν οὐσίαν πρῶτον τί ἐστιν.

Λέγεται δ' ἡ οὐσία, εἰ μὴ πλεοναχῶς, ἀλλ' ἐν τέτταρσί γε μάλιστα· καὶ γὰρ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ καθόλου [35] καὶ τὸ γένος οὐσία δοκεῖ εἶναι ἑκάστου, καὶ τέταρτον τούτων τὸ ὑποκείμενον. Τὸ δ' ὑποκείμενόν ἐστι καθ' οὗ τὰ ἄλλα λέγεται, ἐκεῖνο δὲ αὐτὸ μηκέτι κατ' ἄλλου· διὸ πρῶτον περὶ τούτου διοριστέον· [1029a][1] μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐσία τὸ ὑποκείμενον πρῶτον. Τοιοῦτον δὲ τρόπον μέν τινα ἡ ὕλη λέγεται, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἡ μορφή, τρίτον δὲ τὸ ἐκ τούτων (λέγω δὲ τὴν μὲν ὕλην οἷον τὸν χαλκόν, τὴν δὲ μορφὴν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς [5] ἰδέας, τὸ δ' ἐκ τούτων τὸν ἀνδριάντα τὸ σύνολον), ὥστε εἰ τὸ εἶδος τῆς ὕλης πρότερον καὶ μᾶλλον ὄν, καὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν πρότερον ἔσται διὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον. Νῦν μὲν οὖν τύπῳ εἴρηται τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία, ὅτι τὸ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου ἀλλὰ καθ' οὗ τὰ ἄλλα· δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως· οὐ γὰρ ἱκανόν· [10] αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο ἄδηλον, καὶ ἔτι ἡ ὕλη οὐσία γίγνεται. Εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὕτη οὐσία, τίς ἐστιν ἄλλη διαφεύγει· περιαιρουμένων γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ φαίνεται οὐδὲν ὑπομένον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα τῶν σωμάτων πάθη καὶ ποιήματα καὶ δυνάμεις, τὸ δὲ μῆκος καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος ποσότητές τινες ἀλλ' [15] οὐκ οὐσίαι (τὸ γὰρ ποσὸν οὐκ οὐσία), ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ᾧ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα πρώτῳ, ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν οὐσία. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀφαιρουμένου μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους οὐδὲν ὁρῶμεν ὑπολειπόμενον, πλὴν εἴ τί ἐστι τὸ ὁριζόμενον ὑπὸ τούτων, ὥστε τὴν ὕλην ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι μόνην οὐσίαν οὕτω σκοπουμένοις. [20] Λέγω δ' ὕλην ἣ καθ' αὑτὴν μήτε τὶ μήτε ποσὸν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν λέγεται οἷς ὥρισται τὸ ὄν. Ἔστι γάρ τι καθ' οὗ κατηγορεῖται τούτων ἕκαστον, ᾧ τὸ εἶναι ἕτερον καὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἑκάστῃ (τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα τῆς οὐσίας κατηγορεῖται, αὕτη δὲ τῆς ὕλης), ὥστε τὸ ἔσχατον καθ' αὑτὸ οὔτε τὶ οὔτε ποσὸν [25] οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν ἐστιν· οὐδὲ δὴ αἱ ἀποφάσεις, καὶ γὰρ αὗται ὑπάρξουσι κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων θεωροῦσι συμβαίνει οὐσίαν εἶναι τὴν ὕλην· ἀδύνατον δέ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι ὑπάρχειν δοκεῖ μάλιστα τῇ οὐσίᾳ, διὸ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὐσία δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον [30] τῆς ὕλης. Τὴν μὲν τοίνυν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὐσίαν, λέγω δὲ τὴν ἔκ τε τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῆς μορφῆς, ἀφετέον, ὑστέρα γὰρ καὶ δήλη· φανερὰ δέ πως καὶ ἡ ὕλη· περὶ δὲ τῆς τρίτης σκεπτέον, αὕτη γὰρ ἀπορωτάτη. Ὁμολογοῦνται δ' οὐσίαι εἶναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν τινές, ὥστε ἐν ταύταις ζητητέον πρῶτον.

[1029b][1]

[1028a] [10] The term "being" has several senses, which we have classified in our discussion of the number of senses in which terms are used. It denotes first the " what " of a thing, i.e. the individuality; and then the quality or quantity or any other such category. Now of all these senses which "being" has, the primary sense is clearly the "what," which denotes the substance (because when we describe the quality of a particular thing we say that it is "good or bad," and not "five feet high" or "a man"; but when we describe what it is, we say not that it is "white" or "hot" or "five feet high," but that it is "a man" or "a god"), and all other things are said to "be" because they are either quantities or qualities or affections or some other such thing.

[20] Hence one might raise the question whether the terms "to walk" and "to be well" and "to sit" signify each of these things as "being," or not; and similarly in the case of any other such terms; for not one of them by nature has an independent existence or can be separated from its substance. Rather, if anything it is the thing which walks or sits or is well that is existent.The reason why these things are more truly existent is because their subject is something definite; i.e. the substance and the individual, which is clearly implied in a designation of this kind, since apart from it we cannot speak of "the good" or "sitting." Clearly then it is by reason of the substance that each of the things referred to exists.Hence that which is primarily, not in a qualified sense but absolutely, will be substance.

Now "primary" has several meanings; but nevertheless substance is primary in all senses, both in definition and in knowledge and in time. For none of the other categories can exist separately, but substance alone;and it is primary also in definition, because in the formula of each thing the formula of substance must be inherent; and we assume that we know each particular thing most truly when we know what "man" or "fire" is—

[1028b] [1] rather than its quality or quantity or position; because we know each of these points too when we know what the quantity or quality is.Indeed, the question which was raised long ago, is still and always will be, and which always baffles us—"What is Being?"—is in other words "What is substance?" Some say that it is one1; others, more than one; some, finite2; others, infinite.3 And so for us too our chief and primary and practically our only concern is to investigate the nature of "being" in the sense of substance. Substance is thought to be present most obviously in bodies. Hence we call animals and plants and their parts substances, and also natural bodies, such as fire, water, earth, etc., and all things which are parts of these or composed of these, either of parts or them or of their totality; e.g. the visible universe and its parts, the stars and moon and sun.We must consider whether (a) these are the only substances, or (b) these and some others, or (c) some of these, or (d) some of these and some others, or (e) none of these, but certain others. Some4 hold that the bounds of body—i.e. the surface, line, point and unit—are substances, and in a truer sense than body or the solid.Again, some5 believe that there is nothing of this kind besides sensible things, while others believe in eternal entities more numerous and more real than sensible things. [20] Thus Plato posited the Forms and the objects of mathematics as two kinds of substance, and as a third the substance of sensible bodies;and Speusippus6 assumed still more kinds of substances, starting with "the One," and positing principles for each kind: one for numbers, another for magnitudes, and then another for the soul. In this way he multiplies the kinds of substance. Some7 again hold that the Forms and numbers have the same nature, and that other things—lines and planes—are dependent upon them; and soon back to the substance of the visible universe and sensible things.We must consider, then, with regard to these matters, which of the views expressed is right and which wrong; and what things are substances; and whether there are any substances besides the sensible substances, or not; and how sensible substances exist; and whether there is any separable substance (and if so, why and how) or no substance besides the sensible ones. We must first give a rough sketch of what substance is.

The term "substance" is used, if not in more, at least in four principal cases; for both the essence and the universal and the genus are held to be the substance of the particular, and fourthly the substrate. The substrate is that of which the rest are predicated, while it is not itself predicated of anything else. Hence we must first determine its nature,

[1029a] [1] for the primary substrate is considered to be in the truest sense substance. Now in one sense we call the matter the substrate; in another, the shape ; and in a third, the combination of the two. By matter I mean, for instance, bronze; by shape, the arrangement of the form; and by the combination of the two, the concrete thing: the statue. Thus if the form is prior to the matter and more truly existent, by the same argument it will also be prior to the combination.

We have now stated in outline the nature of substance—that it is not that which is predicated of a subject, but that of which the other things are predicated. But we must not merely define it so, for it is not enough. Not only is the statement itself obscure, but also it makes matter substance; for if matter is not substance, it is beyond our power to say what else is.For when everything else is removed, clearly nothing but matter remains; because all the other things are affections, products and potencies of bodies, and length, breadth and depth are kinds of quantity, and not substances. For quantity is not a substance; rather the substance is that to which these affections primarily belong.But when we take away length and breadth and depth we can see no thing remaining, unless it be the something bounded by them; so that on this view matter must appear to be the only substance. [20] By matter I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor a quantity nor designated by any of the categories which define Being.For there is something of which each of these is predicated, whose being is different from that of each one of the categories; because all other things are predicated of substance, but this is predicated of matter. Thus the ultimate substrate is in itself neither a particular thing nor a quantity nor anything else. Nor indeed is it the negations of these; for the negations too will only apply to it accidentally.

If we hold this view, it follows that matter is substance. But this is impossible; for it is accepted that separability and individuality belong especially to substance. Hence it would seem that the form and the combination of form and matter are more truly substance than matter is.The substance, then, which consists of both—I mean of matter and form—may be dismissed, since it is posterior and obvious. Matter too is in a sense evident. We must consider the third type, for this is the most perplexing.

Now it is agreed that some sensible things are substances, and so we should begin our inquiry in connection with these.

[1029b][1]

[1028a][10]"존재"라는 용어는 몇 가지 의미를 가지고 있는데, 우리는 의미의 수가 사용되는 용어에 대한 논의에서 이를 분류했다.^[1] 그것은 먼저 물건의 "무엇", 즉 개성을 나타낸다. 그런 다음 품질이나 수량 또는 다른 범주를 선택한다. 이제 "존재하는"의 모든 의미들 중에서, 주요 의미는 분명히 물질을 나타내는 "무엇"인가하는 것이다. (왜냐하면 우리가 특정 물건의 품질을 묘사 할 때 그것이 "좋거나 나쁘다"고 말하지 "높이 5피트"또는 "사람"이라고 말하지않는다. 그러나 그것이 무엇인지를 설명할 때 우리는 "흰색" 또는 "뜨겁다" 또는 "높이 5피트"라고 하지않는다. "사람"또는"신 "이라고한다.) 다른 모든 것들은 수량이나 자질 또는 애정이나 다른 어떤 것이기 때문에 "존재하는"것이라고 말해진다.

[20] 그러므로, "걸을 것"과 "잘하는 것"과 "앉아라"는 용어는 각각 "존재"또는 "존재하지 않는 것"으로 의미하는지 의문을 제기 할 수있다. 그러한 다른 용어의 경우에도 마찬가지이다. 그들 중 하나는 본질적으로 독립적인 존재이거나 그 물질과 분리될 수 있기 때문이다. 오히려, 무엇이라도 있으면, 그것은 걷거나 앉거나 잘 존재하는 것이다. 이러한 것들이 더 진실한 이유는 그들의 주제가 확실한 것이기 때문이다. 즉, 물질과 개인은 분명히 이런 종류의 지정에 함축되어있다. 왜냐하면 그것과 별개로 "선한"또는 "앉아있는"것을 말할 수 없기 때문이다. 분명히 그것은 언급된 것들 각각이 존재한다는 사실 때문이다. 그것은 주로 자격있는 의미가 아니라 절대적으로 중요한 것이다.

이제 "기본"에는 몇 가지 의미가 있다. 물질은 정의와 지식과 시간에있어서 모든 감각에서 주요한 요소이다. 다른 범주 각각에 대해, 물질의 공식은 내재적이어야하지만, 또한 물질의 문제이다.

[1028b] [1]그것의 질 또는 양 또는 위치보다는 오히려, 왜냐하면 우리는 양과 질이 어느 정도인지를 알 때 이 점들을 각각을 알기 때문이다. 오래 전에 제기된 이 질문은 언제나 항상 존재할 것이며, 항상 우리를 당황케한다 - "존재"는 무엇인가? 다른 단어 "물질이란 무엇인가?" 어떤 이는 그것이 하나라고 말한다. 다른 것, 둘 이상, 또는 일부, 유한, 또는 무한한 그리고 우리 역시 우리의 주되고 1 차적이며 실질적으로 유일한 관심사는 실체의 의미에서 "존재"의 본질을 조사하는 것이다. 물질은 물체에서 가장 분명하게 존재하는 것으로 생각된다. 그러므로 우리는 동식물과 그 물질의 일부분, 그리고 불, 물, 땅 등의 자연적 몸체와 이것들의 일부분이거나 그것들을 구성하는 전체의 일부인 모든 것을 그렇게 칭하는것을 포함한다. 별과 달과 태양. (a)우리는 이것들이 유일한 물질인지를 고려해야한다. 또는 (b) 이것들과 다른 것들이 있는지, 또는 (c) 이것들은 일부인지 , 또는 (d) 이것들의 일부와 다른것들인지, 또는(e) 이것들 중 어느 것도 아닌것이지. 어떤 사람들에게는 신체의 경계 즉, 표면, 선, 점 및 단위는 물질이며, 몸이나 단단한 것보다 진실한 의미다. 또 어떤 사람들은 합리적인 것들 외에는 이런 종류의 것이 없다고 믿는 반면, 다른 사람들은 감각적인 것들보다 영원한 실체를 믿는다.

[20]따라서 플라톤은 수학의 형태와 사물을 두 종류의 물질로, 세 번째로 물질을 물질로 삼았고, 스페우시포스는 "하나"로 시작하는 더 많은 종류의 물질을 가정했으며 각각의 종류, 숫자를위한 것, 크기를위한 것, 영혼을위한 또 다른 것. 이런 식으로 그는 물질의 종류를 증식시킨다. 때로는 형식과 숫자가 같은 성질을 가지고 있으며, 선과 평면과 같은 다른 것들도 그것들에 의존한다는 것을 주장한다. 곧 가시적인 우주와 합리적인 것들의 실체로 돌아 간다. 우리는 이 문제들에 관해서, 표현 된 견해 중 어느 것이 옳고 틀린지 고려해야한다. 물질은 무엇인가? 및 자명한 물질 이외의 물질이 존재하는지의 여부, 그리고 합리적인 물질이 존재하는 방법, 그리고 분리될 수있는 물질이 있는지 (그렇다면, 왜 그리고 어떻게) 또는 자명하지않은 물질 이외의 물질이 존재하는지의 여부. 먼저 물질이 무엇인지에 대한 대략적인 스케치를해야한다.

"물질"이라는 용어는 적어도 4가지 주요 경우에 더 많이 사용되지는 않는다. 본질과 보편과 속에 대한 속은 그 특정의 실체인것과 그리고 네 번째로 기질이된다. 기질은 나머지가 주장된 반면, 기질은 그 자체로 다른 어떤 것을 주장하지 않는다. 그러므로 우리는 먼저 그 본성을 결정해야하며,

[1029a] [1]

[1029b][1]

참고

1. 형이상학Δ