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A CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES[1][2][3]

심리유형 연구 기고문

[858] It is well known that in their general aspects hysteria and schizophrenia present a striking contrast, which is particularly evident in the attitude of the patients to the external world. In their relations to the object, the hysteric displays as a rule an intensity of feeling that surpasses the normal, while in the schizophrenic the normal level is not reached at all. The clinical picture is exaggerated emotivity in the one, and extreme apathy in the other, with regard to the environment. In their personal relations this difference is marked by the fact that we can remain in affective rapport with our hysterical patients, which is not the case in schizophrenia. The contrast between the two types of illness is also observable in the rest of their symptomatology. So far as the intellectual symptoms of hysteria are concerned, they are fantasy products which may be accounted for in a natural and human way by the antecedents and individual history of the patient; in schizophrenia, on the contrary, the fantasy products are more nearly related to dreams than to the psychology of the waking state. They have, moreover, a distinctly archaic character, the mythological creations of the primitive imagination being far more in evidence than the personal memories of the patient. Finally, the physical symptoms so common in hysteria, which simulate well-known and impressive organic illnesses, are not to be found in the clinical picture of schizophrenia. [859] All this clearly indicates that hysteria is characterized by a centrifugal movement of libido, while in schizophrenia the movement is more centripetal. The reverse obtains, however, when the illness has fully established its compensatory effects. In the hysteric the libido is then hampered in its movement of expansion and is forced to regress upon itself; the patients cease to partake in the common life, are wrapped up in their daydreams, keep to their beds, remain shut up in their sickrooms, etc. During the incubation of his illness the schizophrenic likewise turns away from the outer world in order to withdraw into himself, but when the period of morbid compensation arrives, he seems constrained to draw attention to himself, to force himself upon the notice of those around him, by his extravagant, insupportable, or directly aggressive behaviour. [860] I propose to use the terms extraversion and introversion to describe these two opposite movements of libido, further qualifying them as regressive in pathological cases where delusional ideas, fictions, or fantastic interpretations, all inspired by emotivity, falsify the judgment of the patient about things or about himself. We speak of extraversion when he gives his whole interest to the outer world, to the object, and attributes an extraordinary importance and value to it. When, on the contrary, the objective world sinks into the shadow, at it were, or undergoes a devaluation, while the individual occupies the centre of his own interest and becomes in his own eyes the only person worthy of consideration, it is a case of introversion. I call regressive extraversion the phenomenon which Freud calls transference, when the hysteric projects upon the object his own illusions and subjective valuations. In the same way, I call regressive introversion the opposite phenomenon which we find in schizophrenia, when these fantastic ideas refer to the subject himself. [861] It is obvious that these two contrary movements of libido, as simple psychic mechanisms, may operate alternately in the same individual, since after all they serve the same purpose by different methods—namely, to minister to his well-being. Freud has taught us that in the mechanism of hysterical extraversion the personality seeks to get rid of disagreeable memories and impressions, and to free itself from its complexes, by a process of repression. The individual clings to the object in order to forget these painful contents and leave them behind him. Conversely, in the mechanism of introversion, the libido concentrates itself wholly on the complexes, and seeks to detach and isolate the personality from external reality. This psychological process is associated with a phenomenon which is not properly speaking “repression,” but would be better rendered by the term “devaluation” of the objective world. [862] To this extent, extraversion and introversion are two modes of psychic reaction which can be observed in the same individual. The fact, however, that two such contrary disturbances as hysteria and schizophrenia are characterized by the predominance of the mechanism of extraversion or of introversion suggests that there may also be normal human types who are distinguished by the predominance of one or other of the two mechanisms. And indeed, psychiatrists know very well that long before the illness is fully established, the hysterical patient as well as the schizophrenic is marked by the predominance of his specific type, which reaches back into the earliest years of childhood. [863] As Binet has pointed out so aptly, 1a a neurosis simply emphasizes and throws into excessive relief the characteristic traits of a personality. It has long been known that the so-called hysterical character is not simply the product of the manifest neurosis, but predated it to a certain extent. And Hoch has shown the same thing by his researches into the histories of schizophrenic patients; he speaks of a “shut-in” personality 2 which was present before the onset of the illness. If this is so, we may certainly expect to find the two types outside the sphere of pathology. There are moreover numerous witnesses in literature to the existence of the two types of mentality. Without pretending to exhaust the subject, I will give a few striking examples. [864] So far as my limited knowledge goes, we have to thank William James for the best observations in this respect. He lays down the principle: “Of whatever temperament a professional philosopher is, he tries, when philosophizing, to sink the fact of his temperament.” 3 And starting from this idea, which is altogether in accord with the spirit of psychoanalysis, he divides philosophers into two classes: the “tender-minded” and the “toughminded,” or, as we might also call them, the “spiritually-minded” and the “materially-minded.” The very terms clearly reveal the opposite movements of the libido. The first class direct their libido to the world of thought, and are predominantly introverted; the second direct it to material things and objective reality, and are extraverted. [865] James characterizes the “tender-minded” first of all as rationalistic, “going by principles.” 4 They are the men of principles and systems; they aspire to dominate experience and to transcend it by abstract reasoning, by their logical deductions and purely rational concepts. They care little for facts, and the multiplicity of empirical phenomena hardly bothers or disconcerts them at all; they forcibly fit the data into their ideal constructions, and reduce everything to their a priori premises. This was the method of Hegel in settling beforehand the number of the planets. In the domain of pathology we again meet this kind of philosopher in paranoiacs, who, unperturbed by all factual evidence to the contrary, impose their delirious conceptions on the universe, and find a means of interpreting everything, and according to Adler “arranging” everything, in conformity with their preconceived system. [866] The other characteristics of this type which James enumerates follow logically from these premises. The “tender-minded” man is “intellectualistic, idealistic, optimistic, religious, free-willist, monistic, dogmatical.” 5 All these qualities betray the almost exclusive concentration of libido upon his intellectual life. This concentration on the inner world of thought is nothing else than introversion. In so far as experience plays any role with these philosophers, it serves only as a fillip to abstraction, to the imperative need to fit the multiplicity and chaos of events into an order which, in the last resort, is the creation of purely subjective thinking. [867] The “tough-minded” man, on the other hand, is empirical, “going by facts.” Experience is his master, facts are his guide and they colour all his thinking. It is only tangible phenomena in the outside world that count. Thought is merely a reaction to external experience. For him principles are always of less value than facts; if he has any, they merely reflect and describe the flux of events, and are incapable of forming a system. Hence his theories are liable to inner contradiction and get overlaid by the accumulation of empirical material. Psychic reality limits itself for him to observation and to the experience of pleasure and pain; he does not go beyond that, nor does he recognize the rights of philosophical thought. Remaining on the ever-changing surface of the phenomenal world, he himself partakes of its instability; he sees all its aspects, all its theoretical and practical possibilities, but he never arrives at the unity of a settled system, which alone could satisfy the tender-minded. The tough-minded man is reductive. As James so excellently says: “What is higher is explained by what is lower and treated for ever as a case of ‘nothing but’—nothing but something else of a quite inferior sort.” 6 [868] From these general characteristics, the others which James points out logically follow. The tough-minded man is “sensationalistic,” giving more value to the senses than to reflection. He is “materialistic and pessimistic,” for he knows only too well the uncertainty and hopeless chaos of the course of things. He is “irreligious,” being incapable of asserting the realities of his inner world against the pressure of external facts; a fatalist, because resigned; a pluralist, incapable of all synthesis; and finally a sceptic, as a last and inevitable consequence of all the rest. 7 [869] The expressions, therefore, used by James show clearly that the difference between the types is the result of a different localization of the libido, this “magical power” in the depth of our being, which, depending on the individual, is directed sometimes to our inner life, sometimes to the objective world. Contrasting the religious subjectivism of the solipsist with the contemporary empirical attitude, James says: “But our esteem for facts has not neutralized in us all religiousness. It is itself almost religious. Our scientific temper is devout.” 8 [870] A second parallel is furnished by Wilhelm Ostwald, 9 who divides men of genius into “classics” and “romantics.” The romantics are distinguished by their rapid reactions, their abundant production of ideas, some of which are badly digested and of doubtful value. They are brilliant teachers, of a compelling ardour, and collect round them a large and enthusiastic circle of students, on whom they exert great personal influence. This type is obviously identical with our extraverted type. The classics, on the contrary, are slow to react; they produce with much difficulty, paralyzed by their own severe self-criticism; they have no love for teaching, and are in fact mostly bad teachers, lacking enthusiasm; living apart and absorbed in themselves, they exercise little direct personal influence, making scarcely any disciples, but producing works of finished perfection which often bring them only posthumous fame. This type is an unmistakable introvert. [871] We find a third, very valuable parallel in the aesthetic theory of Wilhelm Worringer. 10 Borrowing A. Riegl’s expression “absolute artistic volition” 11 to designate the internal force which inspires the artist, he distinguishes two forms: abstraction and empathy. He speaks of the urge to abstraction and the urge to empathy, thereby making clear the libidinal nature of these two forms, the stirring of the élan vital. “In the same way,” says Worringer, “as the urge to empathy finds its gratification in organic beauty, so the urge to abstraction discovers beauty in the inorganic, the negation of all life, in crystalline forms or, generally speaking, wherever the severity of abstract law reigns.” 12 Empathy is a movement of libido towards the object in order to assimilate it and imbue it with emotional values; abstraction withdraws libido from the object, despoils it of all that could recall life; leaching out, as it were, its intellectual content, and crystallizing from the lye the typical elements that conform to law, which are either superimposed on the object or are its very antithesis. Bergson also makes use of these images of crystallization and rigidity to illustrate the nature of intellectual abstraction and clarification. [872] Worringer’s “abstraction” represents that process which we have already encountered as a consequence of introversion—the exaltation of the intellect to offset the devaluation of external reality. “Empathy” corresponds to extraversion, as Theodor Lipps had already pointed out. “What I feel myself into is life in general, and life is power, inner work, effort, and accomplishment. To live, in a word, is to act, and to act is to experience the expenditure of my forces. This activity is by its very nature an activity of the will.” 13 “Aesthetic enjoyment,” says Worringer, “is objectified self-enjoyment,” 14 a formula that accords very well with our definition of extraversion. But Worringer’s conception of aesthetics is not vitiated by any “tough-mindedness,” and so he is fully capable of appreciating the value of psychological realities. Hence Worringer says: “The crucial factor is thus not so much the tone of the feeling as the feeling itself, the inner movement, the inner life, the subject’s inner activity.” 15 And again: “The value of a line or of a form consists in the vital value which it holds for us. It acquires its beauty only through the vital feeling which we unconsciously project into it.” 16 These statements correspond exactly to my own view of the theory of libido, which seeks to maintain the balance between the two psychological opposites of extraversion and introversion. [873] The counterpole of empathy is abstraction. According to Worringer, “the urge to abstraction is the outcome of a great inner uneasiness inspired in man by the phenomena of the external world, and its religious counterpart is the strongly transcendental colouring of all ideas. We might describe this state as an immense spiritual dread of space…. This same feeling of fear may also be assumed to be the root of artistic creation.” 17 We recognize in this definition the primary tendency towards introversion. To the introverted type the universe does not appear beautiful and desirable, but disquieting and even dangerous; he entrenches himself in his inner fastness, securing himself by the invention of regular geometrical figures full of repose, whose primitive, magical power assures him of domination over the surrounding world. [874] “The urge to abstraction is the origin of all art,” says Worringer. 18 This idea finds weighty confirmation in the fact that schizophrenics produce forms and figures showing the closest analogy with those of primitive humanity, not only in their thoughts but also in their drawings. [875] In this connection it would be unjust not to recall that Schiller attempted a similar formulation in his naïve and sentimental types. 19 The naïve poet “is Nature, the sentimental seeks her,” he says. The naïve poet expresses primarily himself, while the sentimental is primarily influenced by the object. For Schiller, a perfect example of the naïve poet is Homer. “The naïve poet follows simple Nature and sensation and confines himself to a mere copying of reality.” 20 “The sentimental poet,” on the contrary “reflects on the impression objects make on him, and on that reflection alone depends the emotion with which he is exalted, and which likewise exalts us. Here the object is related to an idea, and on this relation alone depends his poetic power.” 21 But Schiller also saw that these two types result from the predominance of psychological mechanisms which might be present in the same individual. “It is not only in the same poet,” he says, “but even in the same work that these two categories are frequently found united.” 22 These quotations show what types Schiller had in mind, and one recognizes their basic identity with those we have been discussing. [876] We find another parallel in Nietzsche’s contrast between the Apollinian and the Dionysian. 23 The example which Nietzsche uses to illustrate this contrast is instructive—namely, that between dream and intoxication. In a dream the individual is shut up in himself, it is the most intimate of all psychic experiences; in intoxication he is liberated from himself, and, utterly self-forgetful, plunges into the multiplicity of the objective world. In his picture of Apollo, Nietzsche borrows the words of Schopenhauer: “As upon a tumultuous sea, unbounded in every direction, the mariner sits full of confidence in his frail barque, rising and falling amid the raging mountains of waves, so the individual man, in a world of troubles, sits passive and serene, trusting to the principium individuationis.” 24“Yes,” continues Nietzsche, “one might say that the unshakable confidence in this principle, and the calm security of those whom it has inspired, have found in Apollo their most sublime expression, and one might describe Apollo himself as the glorious divine image of the principle of individuation.” 25 [877] The Apollinian state, therefore, as Nietzsche conceives it, is a withdrawal into oneself, or introversion. Conversely the Dionysian state is the unleashing of a torrent of libido into things. “Not only,” says Nietzsche, “is the bond between man and man reconfirmed in the Dionysian enchantment, but alienated Nature, hostile or enslaved, celebrates once more her feast of reconciliation with her prodigal son— Man. Liberally the earth proffers her gifts, and the wild beasts from rock and desert draw near peacefully. The car of Dionysos is heaped with flowers and garlands; panthers and tigers stride beneath his yoke. Transform Beethoven’s Ode to Joy into a painting, and give free rein to your imagination as the awestruck millions prostrate themselves in the dust: thus you approach the Dionysian intoxication. Now is the slave free, now all the rigid, hostile barriers which necessity, caprice, or shameless fashion have set up between man and man are broken down. Now, with this gospel of universal harmony, each feels himself not only united, reconciled, merged with his neighbour, but one with him, as though the veil of Maya had been torn away, and nothing remained of it but a few shreds floating before the mystery of the Primal Unity.” 26 Any commentary on this passage would be superfluous. [878] In concluding this series of examples drawn from outside my own special field of study, I would still like to mention a parallel from the sphere of linguistics, which likewise illustrates our two types. This is Franz Finck’s hypothesis concerning the structure of language. 27 According to Finck, there are two main types of linguistic structure. The one is represented in general by the transitive verbs: I see him, I kill him, etc. The other is represented by the intransitive verbs: He appears before me, he dies at my feet. The first type clearly shows a centrifugal movement of libido going out from the subject; the second, a centripetal movement of libido coming in from the object. The latter, introverting type of structure is found particularly among the primitive languages of the Eskimos. [879] Finally, in the domain of psychiatry our two types have been described by Otto Gross. 28 He distinguishes two forms of inferiority: a type with a diffuse and shallow consciousness, and another with a contracted and deep consciousness. The first is characterized by the weakness, the second by the intense activity, of the “secondary function.” Gross recognized that the secondary function is closely connected with affectivity, from which it is not difficult to see that once again our two types are meant. The relation he established between manic-depressive insanity and the type with a shallow consciousness shows that we are dealing with extraversion, while the relation between the psychology of the paranoiac and the type with a contracted consciousness indicates the identity with introversion. [880] After the foregoing considerations it will come as a surprise to nobody to learn that in the domain of psychoanalysis we also have to reckon with the existence of these two psychological types. On the one side we have a theory which is essentially reductive, pluralistic, causal, and sensualistic. This is the theory of Freud, which is strictly limited to empirical facts, and traces back complexes to their antecedents and to more simple elements. It regards psychological life as consisting in large measure of reactions, and accords the greatest role to sensation. On the other side we have the diametrically opposed theory of Adler, 29 which is thoroughly intellectualistic, monistic, and finalistic. Here psychological phenomena are not reduced to antecedent and more simple elements, but are conceived as “arrangements,” as the outcome of intentions and aims of a complex nature. Instead of the causa efficiens we have the causa finalis. The previous history of the patient and the concrete influences of the environment are of much less importance than his dominating principles, his “guiding fictions.” It is not his striving for the object and his subjective pleasure in it that are the determining factors, but the securing of the individual’s power in the face of the hostile environmental influences.

[881] While the dominant note in Freudian psychology is a centrifugal tendency, a striving for pleasure in the object, in Adler’s it is a centripetal striving for the supremacy of the subject, who wants to be “on top,” to safeguard his power, to defend himself against the overwhelming forces of existence. The expedient to which the type described by Freud resorts is the infantile transference of subjective fantasies into the object, as a compensatory reaction to the difficulties of life. The characteristic recourse of the type described by Adler is, on the contrary, “security,” “masculine protest,” and the stubborn reinforcement of the “guiding fiction.”

프로이드 심리학에서 주요한 언급은 원심적 경향, 즉 대상으로향하는 쾌락을 위한 노력인 반면, 아들러에 있어서 그것은 "상위에 있고", 그의 힘을 보호하며, 압도적인 존재의 힘에 대항하여 자신을 방어하기 위해 애쓰는 구심성의 노력이다. 프로이트가 묘사하는 유형이 의존하는 방편은 삶의 고달픔에 대한 보상적 반응으로서 주관적 환상의 유아적 전이를 대상으로 하는 것이다. 아들러가 묘사하는 유형의 특징적인 의존성은 반대로 '안정', '남성형 시위', '가이드 픽션'의 완강한 강화다.

[882] The difficult task of creating a psychology which will be equally fair to both types must be reserved for the future.

두 유형 모두 똑같이 공평하게 다루어질수있는 심리학의 영역을 개척하는 어려운 과제는 장래로 유보해야겠다.

참고[편집]

  1. [A lecture delivered at the Psychoanalytical Congress in Munich during September 1913 (the last time Jung and Freud met), but not published in German until 1960, as “Zur Frage der psychologischen Typen,” in Gesammelte Werke, 6, Appendix, pp. 541ff. A French translation, incorporating the author’s revisions, appeared in the Archives de psychologie (Geneva), XIII:52 (Dec. 1913), 289–99, and was translated into English by C. E. Long, as “A Contribution to the Study of Psychological Types,” in Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology (London and New York, 1916), pp. 287ff. The present version is based on a comparison of the German original with the previous French and English translations.—EDITORS.]
  2. 심리유형 (Psychological Types)또는 개별적 존재에 관한 심리학(The Psychology of Individuation) Jung, C. G. , 영문 Baynes, Helton Godwin-London: Kegan Paul Trench Trubner & co 1921)
  3. 심리유형-CW6-APPENDIX: FOUR PAPERS ON PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPOLOGY 1. (Collected Works Vol.6 -Psychological Types 1921)

1a [Reference cannot be traced.] 2 [“Constitutional Factors in the Dementia Praecox Group” (1910).—EDITORS.] 3 Pragmatism, p. 7. Cf. also supra, pars. 505ff. 4 Ibid., p. 12. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid., p. 16. 7 Ibid., p. 12. 8 Ibid., p. 15. 9 Grosse Männer. Cf. supra, pars. 542ff. 10 Abstraction and Empathy. Cf. supra, pars. 484ff. 11 Ibid., pp. 9f. [Worringer refers to Riegl, Stilfragen and Spätrömische Kunstindustrie.] 12 Cf. ibid., p. 4. 13 Cited in ibid., p. 5. 14 Ibid. 15 Cf. ibid. 16 Cf. ibid., p. 14. 17 Cf. ibid., p. 15. [See supra, par. 488.] 18 Cf. ibid. 19 “Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung” (Cottasche Ausgabe, XVIII), pp. 205ff. 20 Ibid., p. 248. 21 Ibid., p. 249. 22 Ibid., p. 244. 23 Cf. supra, pars. 223ff. 24 Cf. The World as Will and Idea, p. 455. 25 Cf. The Birth of Tragedy, p. 125. 26 Cf. ibid., pp. 26f. 27 Der deutsche Sprachbau als Ausdruck deutscher Weltanschauung. 28 Die zerebrale Sekundärfunktion. Cf. supra, pars. 461ff. 29 The Neurotic Constitution.